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Lectures
TRANSPARENT AND EFFICIENT MARKETS:
COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND
COERCED COMMERCIAL ASSOCIATION IN
UNITED FOODS, ZAUDERER, AND ABOOD
Robert Post*
In recent years the Court has decided three cases that address the
compelled subsidization of commercial speech. Each of these cases
involves a federal statute that creates an industry board empowered to
tax producers of a specific agricultural product in order to promote and
stabilize the market in that product. Taken together, the decisions in this
trilogy evidence manifest and disturbing confusion about the
constitutional status of commercial speech. At stake in this confusion is
the extent to which First Amendment protections for commercial speech
will invalidate regulations that now routinely require commercial actors
to disclose information to promote transparent and efficient markets.
The first case in the trilogy was Glickman v. Wileman Brothers &
Elliott,1 which was decided in 1997. Glickman upheld a federal marketing
program that required private parties to subsidize an advertising
campaign for California summer fruits. Dismissing claims that this
mandated subsidization amounted to compelled speech in violation of
the First Amendment, the Court in a narrow five-to-four opinion held
that “[o]ur compelled speech case law . . . is clearly inapplicable to the
regulatory scheme at issue here.”2 Four years later, however, the Court
reversed course and in United States v. United Foods, Inc.3 struck down a
similar program designed to promote and stabilize the market in fresh
mushrooms. The Court held that “First Amendment concerns apply”
whenever the state requires persons to “subsidize speech with which
they disagree.”4
This holding revolutionized First Amendment
jurisprudence in the area of the compelled subsidization of speech,

David Boies Professor Law, Yale Law School. I am grateful for the unceasing and
generous assistance of David Newman, Matt Spence, Rob Wiygul, and Mark Wu.
1
521 U.S. 457 (1997).
2
Id. at 470.
3
533 U.S. 405 (2001).
4
Id. at 410–11.
*
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sparking a cascade of challenges to agricultural government marketing
programs in the lower courts.5
Most recently, the Court in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n6
turned yet another about-face. In the context of a program to promote
the market in beef products that was “on all fours with United Foods,”7
the Court held that because “compelled funding of government speech
does not alone raise First Amendment concerns,”8 and because the beef
advertisements produced by the program were government speech, the
program was immune from First Amendment challenge based upon
claims of compelled subsidization of speech. Johanns went out of its way
to offer a generous and encompassing definition of government speech9
that seemed deliberately designed to end the many challenges that after
United Foods had engulfed government agricultural marketing programs.

5
See, e.g., Pelts & Skins, LLC v. Landreneau, 365 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2004) (Louisiana
Alligator Resource Fund), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2511 (2005); Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263
(3d Cir. 2004) (Dairy Promotion Stabilization Act of 1983), vacated sub nom. Lovell v.
Cochran, 125 S. Ct. 2511 (2005), and Johanns v. Cochran, 125 S. Ct. 2512 (2005); Mich. Pork
Producers Ass’n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157 (6th Cir. 2003) (Pork Promotion, Research and
Consumer Info. Act), vacated sub nom. Mich. Pork Producers Ass’n v. Campaign for Family
Farms, 125 S. Ct. 2511 (2005), and Johanns v. Campaign for Family Farms, 125 S. Ct. 2511
(2005); Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 318 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2003)
(California Table Grape Comm’n); In re Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 257 F. Supp. 2d
1290 (E.D. Wash. 2003) (Washington State Apple Commission); Charter v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (D. Mont. 2002), vacated, 412 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2005); Gerawan
Farming, Inc. v. Kawamura, 90 P.3d 1179 (Cal. 2004); Dep’t of Citrus v. Graves Bros. Co.,
889 So. 2d 831 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), vacated, Fla. Dep’t of Citrus v. Graves Bros. Co., 912
So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 2005).
6
125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005).
7
Id. at 2070 (Souter, J., dissenting).
8
Id. at 2062.
9
“When, as here, the government sets the overall message to be communicated and
approves every word that is disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the
government-speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental
sources in developing specific messages.” Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2063.
Here, the beef advertisements are subject to political safeguards more
than adequate to set them apart from private messages. The program
is authorized and the basic message prescribed by federal statute, and
specific requirements for the promotions’ content are imposed by
federal regulations promulgated after notice and comment. The
Secretary of Agriculture, a politically accountable official, oversees the
program, appoints and dismisses the key personnel, and retains
absolute veto power over the advertisements’ content, right down to
the wording. And Congress, of course, retains oversight authority, not
to mention the ability to reform the program at any time. No more is
required.
Id. at 2064.
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Johanns is very narrowly written. It does not in any way undermine
or limit the reasoning of United Foods in cases that do not involve
government speech. That reasoning has fundamentally altered received
First Amendment doctrine in at least three respects:
1.

United Foods states that First Amendment
questions are raised whenever government forces
“individuals to pay subsidies for speech to
which they object.”10

2.

United Foods holds that courts should carefully
review statutes that require the compelled
subsidization of commercial speech.

3.

United Foods holds that serious First
Amendment questions are raised whenever the
state compels persons to associate with an
organization whose primary purpose is to
engage in commercial speech.

Each of these propositions is novel, and each is in my view seriously
misguided. One obvious implication of the first proposition is that
courts ought rigorously to review the use of tax dollars to support
government speech. This implication was so radical that the Court felt
impelled in Johanns immediately to intervene to disavow it. I discuss the
errors implicit in the first proposition elsewhere,11 and I shall not repeat
that critique here.
In this Lecture I shall instead focus on the jurisprudential difficulties
created by the second and third innovative propositions advanced by
United Foods. I shall argue that these innovations implicitly re-evaluate
the constitutional status of commercial speech by shifting the focus of
constitutional analysis from the circulation of information to the
independent interests of commercial speakers to speak or to associate. It
is evident that United Foods did not carefully consider the implications of
this shift for the general structure of commercial speech doctrine or for
the pervasive regimes of regulation that now envelop commercial
speech. Taken to its logical conclusion, the shift is so potentially
destabilizing that it is unlikely to be sustained in anything like the pure
form in which it is expressed in United Foods.
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001).
Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 2005
SUP. CT. REV. 195 (2006).
10
11
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My objective in this Lecture is to make explicit the potential
consequences of the second and third innovations of United Foods, in the
hope that we may in the future avoid the kind of doctrinal uncertainty
and embarrassment that has unfortunately already plagued the
Glickman-United Foods-Johanns triology.
I. COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH BEFORE UNITED FOODS
The Court first held that the Constitution protected commercial
speech in 1976, when in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.12 it overruled prior precedent13 to decide
that the First Amendment constrained state regulation of commercial
advertising. From the outset the Court insisted that “[o]ur jurisprudence
has emphasized that ‘commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of
First Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of regulation that
might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.’”14
Although content-based regulations of public discourse are subject to
strict scrutiny, content-based restrictions of commercial speech are
subject to review under the relatively more lenient terms of the so-called
Central Hudson test:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis
has developed. At the outset, we must determine
whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within
that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.15

425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution imposes no . . .
restraint on government” regulation of “purely commercial advertising.”).
14
Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)); see, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995). In recent years, this black-letter proposition has become
contestable. Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The
Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123.
15
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). The
Court has applied the Central Hudson test in radically inconsistent ways. Compare, e.g.,
12
13
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Commercial speech receives diminished constitutional protection
because “[t]he First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is
based on the informational function of advertising.”16
Whereas
communication within “public discourse”17 is protected both because of
its participatory value to a speaker and because of its informational value
to an audience,18 “[a] commercial advertisement is constitutionally
protected not so much because it pertains to the seller’s business as
because it furthers the societal interest in the ‘free flow of commercial
information.’”19
In 1985 in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,20 the Court used
this explanation of the constitutional status of commercial speech as the
premise for its analysis of the problem of mandatory commercial
disclosures. At issue in Zauderer was a government requirement that
speakers include information in their advertisements in order to avoid
deceiving consumers. The case involved the constitutionality of a
Disciplinary Rule of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility
providing that lawyers could advertise contingent fee rates only if they
disclosed “whether percentages are computed before or after deduction
of court costs and expenses.”21 Because this Disciplinary Rule required
lawyers to speak in ways that they would have preferred to avoid,
Zauderer was required to address the question of compelled commercial
speech.
Zauderer acknowledged that compelled speech within the realm of
public discourse raised serious constitutional questions, as the Court had

Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), with Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). More than a majority of the Justices have at one time or another
indicated their dissatisfaction with the test. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484 (1996). Yet the Court has continued to apply the test with increasing severity. See,
e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367–68 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554–55 (2001); Greater New Orleans Bd. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S.
173, 183 (1999).
16
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563; see Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial
Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000); see also Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First
Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 372, 384 (1979).
17
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 682–83 (1986); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
802 (1985).
18
For a discussion, see Post, supra note 16.
19
First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
20
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
21
Id. at 633.
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ruled in precedents like West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,22 in
which schoolchildren were required to recite the Pledge of Allegiance,
and Wooley v. Maynard,23 in which a Jehovah’s witness was required to
display the state motto of New Hampshire on the license plate of his
automobile. Zauderer found that compelled commercial speech was
different, however, because the regulation of commercial speech did not
implicate constitutional “interests . . . of the same order as those
discussed in Wooley . . . and Barnette.”24 The Court explained that
“[b]ecause the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the
information such speech provides,” a speaker’s “constitutionally
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in
his advertising is minimal.”25
Zauderer accordingly advanced an extraordinarily lenient test for the
review of compelled commercial speech. It held that commercial speech
could be compelled so “long as disclosure requirements are reasonably
related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”26
This standard for compelling commercial speech was far weaker than the
Central Hudson test that applied to restrictions on commercial speech:
We reject appellant’s contention that we should subject
disclosure requirements to a strict “least restrictive
means” analysis under which they must be struck down
if there are other means by which the State’s purposes
may be served. Although we have subjected outright
prohibitions on speech to such analysis, all our
discussions of restraints on commercial speech have
recommended disclosure requirements as one of the
acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual

319 U.S. 624 (1943).
430 U.S. 705 (1977).
24
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
25
Id. Although the Court minimized the interests of a commercial speaker, it did not
entirely deny them:
Thus, in virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date, we have
emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench much more
narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on
speech, “warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately
required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion
or deception.”
Id. It is striking that in the context of public discourse compelling speech is frequently
regarded as less acceptable than prohibiting speech.
26
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
22
23
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suppression of speech. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas &
Electric, 447 U.S., at 565, 100 S.Ct., at 2351. Because the
First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure
requirements are substantially weaker than those at
stake when speech is actually suppressed, we do not
think it appropriate to strike down such requirements
merely because other possible means by which the State
might achieve its purposes can be hypothesized.27
Zauderer’s holding that restrictions on commercial speech should be
more stringently reviewed than compulsions to engage in commercial
speech follows directly from the Court’s understanding of the
constitutional value of commercial speech. Because restrictions on
commercial speech threaten to diminish the “‘free flow of commercial
information,’”28 whereas compulsions to speak increase the flow of that
information, the latter actually advances the constitutional value
attributed to commercial speech. The state’s interest in avoiding
potential deception follows directly from the need to ensure “that the
stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly. . . .”29 Insofar as the
constitutional value of commercial speech derives from the
informational benefits of this flow, state compulsions to engage in
commercial speech do not compromise constitutionally protected
interests possessed by commercial speakers.
Within public discourse, by contrast, the First Amendment ascribes
constitutionally valuable interests to speakers,30 which is why the Court
in cases like Barnette and Wooley rigorously scrutinized mandated forms
of participation within public discourse. Zauderer specifically and
explicitly emphasizes the distinction between commercial speech and
27

Id. at 651 n.14. The Court continued:
Similarly, we are unpersuaded by appellant’s argument that a
disclosure requirement is subject to attack if it is “under-inclusive”—
that is, if it does not get at all facets of the problem it is designed to
ameliorate. As a general matter, governments are entitled to attack
problems piecemeal, save where their policies implicate rights so
fundamental that strict scrutiny must be applied. . . . The right of a
commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his
services is not such a fundamental right.

Id.
First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
Citizens v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
29
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S.
at 771–72).
30
Robert Post, 1997 Survey of Books Relating to the Law: I. Constitutional Law: Equality and
Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (1997).
28
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public discourse by holding that a commercial speaker’s constitutional
interest in not being compelled to provide “purely factual and
uncontroversial information”31 is “minimal.”32 The Court would surely
not characterize as “minimal” the constitutional interests of participants
in public discourse, like the New York Times, to refuse to publish accurate
factual information to supplement what the government might regard as
a potentially misleading editorial.33
“A vast regulatory apparatus in both the federal government and the
states . . . to control . . . potentially misleading or deceptive speech”34 has
been erected on the foundation of Zauderer. This apparatus routinely
compels commercial speech by requiring commercial speakers to
disclose information to consumers.35 There are many reasons for
mandating the disclosure of commercial information. Sometimes, as in
Zauderer, disclosures are compelled in order to prevent potential
deception. But frequently the disclosure of information is required in
order to promote transparent and efficient markets.36 To tamper with
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
Id.
33
See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
34
Sullivan, supra note 14, at 153.
35
For a sample of the many recent cases affirming compelled disclosures under
Zauderer, see, e.g., United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 631 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding order
requiring peddlers of suspect tax advice to post a copy of an injunction issued against them
on their web site); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001)
(upholding a requirement that lightbulb manufacturers disclose the mercury content of
their products because “Zauderer, not Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n . . . describes the relationship between means and ends demanded by the First
Amendment in compelled commercial disclosure cases”); United States v. Wenger, 292 F.
Supp. 2d 1296, 1304 (D. Utah 2003) (concluding that the disclosure requirement of 17(b) of
the Securities Act of 1933 is constitutional because “[t]hough Central Hudson applies to
statutes that restrict commercial speech, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel discusses
the distinction between statutes mandating disclosures versus statutes prohibiting
speech”); and Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Tenn. Regulatory Auth., 79 S.W.3d 506, 520
(Tenn. 2002) (upholding regulation that compelled a telephone service provider to list its
competitors on the cover of the phonebook because “under current law—as announced in
Zauderer—as long as the disclosure requirement is reasonably related to the state’s interest
in preventing deception of consumers, and not unduly burdensome, it should be upheld”).
36
See, e.g., David S. Rudner, Balancing Investor Protection with Capital Formation Needs
After the SEC Chamber of Commerce Case, 26 PACE L. REV. 39, 64 (2005) (discussing the
benefits to market efficiency of the SEC’s required disclosure rules). The SEC, for example,
requires broker-dealers to make comprehensive disclosures about the risks of investing in
order to provide investors with “market transparency.” O. Dennis Hernandez, Jr., BrokerDealer Regulation Under the New Penny Stock Disclosure Rules: An Appraisal, 1993 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 27, 29. A similar rationale lies behind mandatory disclosure rules for credit
card companies. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the various credit terms available to him . . . .”). See also infra notes 133–35.
31
32
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Zauderer’s understanding of compelled commercial speech is thus to
trouble the foundations of pervasive and well-established regulatory
regimes that presently govern American markets and protect American
consumers. When the Court sought to address the question of
compelled subsidization commercial speech in United Foods, it was
intervening into a complex regulatory environment that had been
established in reliance on the Court’s own precedent.
It is true that Zauderer concerned compelled commercial speech,
whereas United Foods addressed the seemingly distinct question of
compelled subsidization of commercial speech. But in the contexts we
are considering, the First Amendment values at stake in the compelled
subsidization of speech derive from the First Amendment values at stake
in compulsions to speak. If circumstances are such that it would not be
unconstitutional to compel someone to speak, as for example to testify
before a legislature, it would also not be unconstitutional to compel them
to subsidize that speech.37 For purposes of comparing Zauderer with
United Foods, therefore, we can analyze the constitutional questions
raised by compelled subsidization of commercial speech in terms of the
constitutional issues raised by compelled commercial speech.
II. COMPELLED ASSOCIATION BEFORE UNITED FOODS
United Foods also intervened into what had long been settled doctrine
in the area of compelled association. The Court first began to develop
doctrine theorizing the connection between compelled association and
the compelled subsidization of groups in 1977 in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education.38 Abood held that serious First Amendment questions were
raised by a state law creating an agency shop in which all employees
were required to pay to the union that was their collective bargaining
agent a fee that was equal in amount to union dues. These First
Amendment questions concerned the right of employees not to be
compelled to subsidize the ideological speech of an expressive
association like a union.
Abood did not argue that the speech of the union would be attributed
to the dissident employees who were compelled to contribute fees to the
union. Instead Abood invoked the Court’s decision the previous year in

37
Another way to make this point is that speech is often expensive because it consumes
resources like time and energy, and in such circumstances to compel persons to speak is the
same as to compel them to subsidize speech.
38
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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Buckley v. Valeo,39 which had held “that contributing to an organization
for the purpose of spreading a political message is protected by the First
Amendment.”40 Abood decided that by parity of reasoning “[t]o compel
employees financially to support their collective-bargaining
representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests. An
employee may very well have ideological objections to a wide variety of
activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive
representative.”41
The fact that the appellants are compelled to make,
rather than prohibited from making, contributions for
political purposes works no less an infringement of their
constitutional rights. For at the heart of the First
Amendment is the notion that an individual should be
free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s
beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience
rather than coerced by the State.
....
These principles prohibit a State from compelling any
individual to affirm his belief in God, . . . or to associate
with a political party, . . . as a condition of retaining
public employment. They are no less applicable to the
case at bar, and they thus prohibit the appellees from
requiring any of the appellants to contribute to the
support of an ideological cause he may oppose as a
condition of holding a job as a public school teacher.42
Abood argued that because Buckley had held that First Amendment
issues were raised by restrictions of “support of an ideological cause,” so
constitutional issues would be raised by compelled support for such a
cause. Buckley had upheld restrictions on contributions to political
candidates if the government was able to advance a sufficiently
important state purpose, such as “the prevention of corruption and the
appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive
influence of large financial contributions on candidates’ positions and on
their actions if elected to office.”43 Abood analogously upheld compelled
39
40
41
42
43

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/1

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Abood, 431 U.S. at 234.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 234–35.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
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contributions to unions if the government was able to advance a
sufficiently important state purpose, such as promoting “peaceful labor
relations to permit a union and an employer to conclude an agreement
requiring employees who obtain the benefit of union representation to
share its cost.”44 Because the state had no interest in compelling persons
to contribute to “ideological activities unrelated to collective
bargaining,”45 Abood held that compulsory dues could not be used to
support ideological speech that was “not germane to collective
bargaining.”46 This is the origin of Abood’s well-known “germaneness
test.”
The Court subsequently reaffirmed Abood’s analysis in Keller v. State
Bar of California,47 which interpreted Abood to rest on the premise “that
just as prohibitions on making contributions to organizations for political
purposes implicate fundamental First Amendment concerns, . . .
compelled . . . contributions for political purposes work no less an
infringement of . . . constitutional rights.’”48 Keller applied the doctrinal
structure established by Abood to hold that lawyers could be compelled
to contribute dues to an integrated state bar so long as these dues were
used to fund only “activities . . . germane to” the “purpose for which
compelled association was justified: . . . the State’s interest in regulating
the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services.”49 The
dues could not be used to “fund activities of an ideological nature which
fall outside of those areas of activity.”50
Latent in Abood, however, was a subtle ambiguity. Compelling
dissident employees to pay dues to a union does not require them
merely to support the speech of the union. It also forces them to affiliate
with the union, which is itself a distinct expressive association. Abood
briefly recognized this point when it noted that compelled union dues
raised the question of “an employee’s freedom to associate for the
advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit.”51 The
mandated union dues at issue in Abood thus threatened two distinct First
Amendment rights: freedom of speech and freedom of association.
44
Abood, 431 U.S. at 219. In essence, Abood held that compelled association was required
to preclude the possibility that employees who otherwise received the benefits of
unionization could “free ride” on the union’s collective bargaining power.
45
Id. at 236.
46
Id. at 219.
47
496 U.S. 1 (1990).
48
Id. at 9–10.
49
Id. at 13–14.
50
Id. at 14.
51
Abood, 431 U.S. at 222.
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At one level, these two separate rights are interrelated because First
Amendment rights of freedom of association derive from constitutional
rights of freedom of speech.52 First Amendment rights of association
protect the “ability and the opportunity to combine with others to
advance one’s views.”53 “The Court has recognized a right to associate
for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances,
and the exercise of religion.”54 State regulation of association raises
constitutional concerns when it restricts the capacity of persons to
associate “for the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious
activities.”55
It follows that there is no First Amendment right to associate in
order to engage in forms of speech that are not protected by the First
Amendment. Ordinary restrictions on the purchase of corporate stock,
for example, do not infringe First Amendment rights of association. The
scope of First Amendment rights of association thus depend upon the
forms of speech that are protected by the First Amendment.
The First Amendment paradigmatically safeguards speech that
embodies values associated with democratic legitimation.56 I have used
the label “public discourse” to designate speech that embodies these
values.57 Just as the First Amendment protects the ability of persons to
52
First Amendment rights of freedom of association are distinct from due process rights
of association, which protect “choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationships . . . against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional
scheme.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984). These forms of intimate
association receive “protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty.” Id. at 618.
53
N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988). See Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1311–12 (2006):
We have recognized a First Amendment right to associate for the
purpose of speaking . . . . The reason we have extended First
Amendment protection in this way is clear: The right to speak is often
exercised most effectively by combining one’s voice with the voices of
others. . . . If the government were free to restrict individuals’ ability
to join together and speak, it could essentially silence views that the
First Amendment is intended to protect.
54
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
55
Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Intern. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987).
56
See Post, supra note 16, at 9–10; Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1254–55 (1995); see also JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY,
AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 12–16, 43–49 (1999); James Weinstein,
Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v.
Kasky, 54. CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1094–10 (2004).
57
Robert Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 481 (1997).
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participate in public discourse so as to render public opinion responsive
to their views, so the First Amendment protects the ability of persons to
participate in public discourse by joining together to amplify their views
in order to make them more effective. Because there is a First
Amendment right not to be forced to speak within public discourse,58 the
Court has also concluded that “[f]reedom of association . . . plainly
presupposes a freedom not to associate.”59 To require persons to
associate against their will with organizations that seek to influence
public opinion is to undermine the value of democratic legitimation by
frustrating the aspiration of persons to render public opinion responsive
to their own views.
Although rights of speech and association are interdependent, they
are also analytically distinct, as can be seen in Abood itself. Labor unions
are organizations with ideological purposes and messages, so that First
Amendment rights of association attach to their formation.60 First
Amendment concerns are therefore triggered by requiring dissident
employees to affiliate with labor unions, whether or not the dues of
dissident employees are used to support the specifically ideological
speech of unions. The right not to associate with a union, and the right
not to support its ideological speech, are logically separate issues.
The Court began doctrinally to recognize this distinction in Ellis v.
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerk.61 The puzzle faced by
Ellis was how to distinguish union activities that could be supported by
compulsory dues from those activities that could not. Ellis began its
analysis of the problem with the premise that “by allowing the union
shop at all, we have already countenanced a significant impingement on
First Amendment rights” because the “dissenting employee is forced to
support financially an organization with whose principles and demands
he may disagree.”62
Ellis concluded that compelled dues could
constitutionally be sustained only insofar as unions acted to advance
purposes that justified compulsory affiliation. Ellis identified “the
governmental interest in industrial peace”63 as such a purpose, and it
therefore held that “the test must be whether the challenged
58
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988); Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
59
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
60
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102–04
(1940).
61
466 U.S. 435 (1984).
62
Id. at 455.
63
Id. at 456.
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expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of
performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in
dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.”64
In this way Ellis moved beyond Abood’s narrow focus on the
ideological speech of unions and instead began to address the separate
question of compulsory affiliation. Ruling that mandatory dues, even if
spent for non-ideological purposes, nevertheless “involve additional
interference with the First Amendment interests of objecting employees,”
Ellis required courts to determine with respect to all such dues “whether
they are nonetheless adequately supported by a governmental
interest.”65 The Court consolidated this doctrinal structure in Lehnert v.
Ferris Faculty Ass’n,66 holding “that chargeable activities must (1) be
‘germane’ to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the
government’s vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding ‘free
riders’; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that
is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop.”67
Ellis and Lehnert articulated a doctrinal structure that protects the
right of dissident employees not to be compelled to affiliate with unions.
Mandatory dues are conceived as a form of compulsory affiliation,
which are permissible only insofar as they are justified by the state’s goal
of promoting collective bargaining. The right to be free from coerced
affiliation is logically distinct from the right of dissident employees not
to be compelled to subsidize the specific ideological speech of unions.
The difference is evident in a recent decision like Romero v. Colegio de
Abogados de Puerto Rico,68 in which the First Circuit struck down an
integrated bar’s efforts to use compulsory dues to fund mandatory life
insurance policies. Although no First Amendment issue of freedom of
speech is plausibly raised by the use of bar dues to purchase life
insurance policies, Romero nevertheless held that a bar’s use of
compulsory dues to purchase life insurance violates the right of dissident
attorneys not to be compelled to affiliate with the expressive association
of the bar:
The very act of the state compelling an employee or an
attorney to belong to or pay fees to a union or bar
association implicates that person’s First Amendment
64
65
66
67
68
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right not to associate. . . . In both situations, strong
public interests justify the intrusion, and the
germaneness test guarantees that these public interests
are being served by any challenged activity. Compelling
financial support for activities wholly unrelated to those
public interests, however, changes the balance and
weakens the justification that supported the intrusion on
First Amendment associational interests in the first
place.
Simply stated, that an individual may be
compelled to associate and financially contribute for
some purposes does not mean she may be compelled to
associate and financially contribute for all purposes. . . .
Without this germaneness check, once a person is
compelled to join and support a bar association for
legitimate reasons, she could be forced to pay for any
bar activity for any reason or no reason, as long as it did
not involve political or ideological expression.69
By the time of United Foods, therefore, the Court had held that
constitutional questions of coerced affiliation would arise whenever
persons were forced to subsidize “expressive” organizations like unions
or bar associations. Organizations were deemed “expressive” whenever
they engaged in “protected speech.”70 Persons could be compelled to
associate with expressive associations only insofar as the affiliation was
“germane” to a state purpose that was sufficiently important to justify
coerced affiliation. The Court used the “germaneness test” of Abood to
protect the distinct right of freedom of association.

Id. at 301. Romero should be contrasted with a decision like Popejoy v. New. Mexico
Board of Bar Commissioners, 887 F. Supp. 1422 (D.N.M. 1995), which, by focusing sharply on
freedom of speech as distinct from association, rejected a lawyer’s claim that his Bar’s
“acquisition of excess office space” was a violation of the First Amendment. “Construction
of a building or maintenance of excess space are activities with no communicative value
and expressing no ideological or political viewpoint; as such, they do not meaningfully
implicate the core First Amendment principle of preventing compelled ideological
conformity.” Id. at 1429. Popejoy did not appreciate the distinction between compelled
speech and compelled association, a distinction that came increasingly into focus in the
development of the Court’s doctrine between Abood and Lehnert.
70
Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Intern. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987).
69
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III. THE INNOVATIONS OF UNITED FOODS
A. Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott
In 1997 the Court revisited questions of compelled commercial
speech and coerced affiliation in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott,71
which was a suit brought by producers of California summer fruits.
Glickman involved the constitutionality of marketing orders promulgated
by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937.72 The Act created forms of comprehensive
economic regulation “in order to establish and maintain orderly
marketing conditions and fair prices. . . .”73 Displacing “competition”
and explicitly exempting producers from antitrust laws, the Act
authorized mechanisms that created uniform prices, limited the quality
and the quantity of commodities, specified the grades and sizes of
commodities, sanctioned joint research and development projects, and
established standardized packaging requirements.74
It imposed
mandatory assessments on producers of California summer tree fruits,
which were used by the Nectarine Administrative Committee and the
Peach Commodity Committee to subsidize generic advertisements for
these products. Plaintiffs in the case were producers of California
summer fruits who were subject to the assessments. They argued that
the First Amendment prohibited compulsory fees for the purpose of
subsidizing “generic advertising.”75
In a five-to-four opinion authored by Justice Stevens,76 the Court
rejected plaintiffs’ claim. Glickman refused to regard the mandatory
assessments as involving compelled commercial speech. It reasoned that
because the mandatory assessments did not require plaintiffs
“themselves to speak, but . . . merely . . . to make contributions for
advertising,”77 “our compelled speech case law . . . is clearly inapplicable
to the regulatory scheme at issue here.”78

521 U.S. 457 (1997).
7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)(I) (2000).
73
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 461.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 462.
76
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Souter, Scalia, and Thomas dissented.
77
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 471. The Court noted that the mandatory assessments “do not
compel any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech.” Id. at 469.
The use of assessments to pay for advertising does not require
respondents to repeat an objectionable message out of their own
mouths, cf. Barnette, . . . require them to use their own property to
71
72
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Glickman refused to interpret Abood as holding that the compelled
subsidization of speech was constitutionally equivalent to compelled
speech. Glickman instead read Abood to address the question of
compelled affiliation with an expressive association. “Abood, and the
cases that follow it, did not announce a broad First Amendment right not
to be compelled to provide financial support for any organization that
conducts expressive activities. Rather, Abood merely recognized a First
Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an
organization whose expressive activities”79 would “engender any crisis
of conscience.”80
Because the advertisements authorized by the
Nectarine Administrative Committee and the Peach Commodity
Committee did “not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any
political or ideological views,”81 the mandatory assessments did not
require plaintiffs to affiliate with an expressive association.82
In effect, Glickman held that although there was a First Amendment
right to refuse to affiliate with an association that participates in public
discourse, there was no First Amendment right to refuse to affiliate with
an association that engaged merely in commercial speech. The First
Amendment extended only “minimal constitutional protection” to “the
freedom of commercial association.”83 The mandatory assessments were
simply “a species of economic regulation that should enjoy the same
convey an antagonistic ideological message, cf. Wooley, . . . force them
to respond to a hostile message when they “would prefer to remain
silent,” . . . or require them to be publicly identified or associated with
another’s message, cf. PruneYard. . . . Respondents are not required
themselves to speak, but are merely required to make contributions for
advertising. With trivial exceptions on which the court did not rely,
none of the generic advertising conveys any message with which
respondents disagree. Furthermore, the advertising is attributed not to
them, but to the California Tree Fruit Agreement or “California
Summer Fruits.”
Id. at 470–71.
78
Id. at 470.
79
Id. at 471.
80
Id. at 472.
81
Id. at 469–70.
82
“The collective programs authorized by the marketing order do not, as a general
matter, impinge on speech or association rights.” Id. at 473 n.16. Cf. Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634, 635 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (finding that there are “only minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of
commercial association” and that an association whose “activities are not predominantly of
the type protected by the First Amendment” is subject to “rationally related state
regulation of its membership”).
83
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 473 n.16 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634–35
(1984) (Opinion of O’Connor, J.)).
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strong presumption of validity that we accord to other policy judgments
made by Congress.”84
Although Glickman explicitly held that the mandatory assessments
did not impinge on First Amendment rights of speech or association,85 it
also, and somewhat mysteriously, applied the “germaneness” test of
Abood:
[R]ather than suggesting that mandatory funding of
expressive activities always constitutes compelled
speech in violation of the First Amendment, our cases
provide affirmative support for the proposition that
assessments to fund a lawful collective program may
sometimes be used to pay for speech over the objection
of some members of the group.86
Mandatory funding of “expressive activities” was constitutional,
Glickman ruled, if “germane” to a sufficiently important state purpose.
Because the purpose of the marketing orders was to maintain stable and
orderly markets, and because “the generic advertising of California
peaches and nectarines is unquestionably germane to” that purpose,87
Glickman concluded that the mandatory assessments were constitutional.
Glickman thus offered three logically distinct and independent
justifications for its holding. It reasoned that First Amendment rights of
freedom of speech were not implicated by the mandatory assessments
because compelled subsidization of speech is different from compelled
speech. It argued that First Amendment rights of freedom of association
were not infringed because the mandatory assessments, at most,
established a connection to an organization that was not expressive.
And it concluded that even if First Amendment rights of compelled
speech or compelled association were implicated, the mandatory
assessments were justified because they were germane to a sufficiently
important state purpose.
Glickman provoked an aggressive and ambitious dissent by Justice
Souter, who argued that “laws requiring an individual to engage in or

Glickman, 521 U.S. at 477.
“The legal question that we address is whether being compelled to fund this
advertising raises a First Amendment issue for us to resolve, or rather is simply a question
of economic policy for Congress and the Executive to resolve.” Id. at 468.
86
Id. at 472–73; see id. at 483, 487–88 (Souter, J., dissenting).
87
Id. at 473 (majority opinion).
84
85
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pay for expressive activities are reviewed under the same standard that
applies to laws prohibiting one from engaging in or paying for such
activities.”88 The idea that the government “may compel subsidization
for any objectionable message that is not political or ideological,” Souter
asserted, was “entirely at odds with the principle that speech significant
enough to be protected at some level is outside the government’s power
to coerce or to support by mandatory subsidy without further
justification.”89 Ignoring if not flatly contradicting the logic of Zauderer,
Souter proceeded from the premise that “forced payment for commercial
speech should be subject to the same level of judicial scrutiny as any
restriction on communications in that category.”90 Since restrictions on
commercial speech would be subject to the Central Hudson test, Souter
applied that test to the mandatory assessments and found them
wanting.91
B. United States v. United Foods, Inc.
Four years after Glickman the Court executed a sharp and
unexpected volte-face in United States v. United Foods, Inc.,92 which
involved a challenge to the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and
Consumer Information Act.93 The Act authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture to create a Mushroom Council empowered to impose
mandatory assessments on handlers of fresh mushrooms in order to
serve the statute’s goals of advancing projects of mushroom promotion,
research, consumer information, and industry information.94 It was
“undisputed . . . that most moneys raised by the assessments [were]
spent for generic advertising to promote mushroom sales.”95 The
plaintiff, a large agricultural enterprise, alleged that the assessments
were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Surprisingly, the
Court agreed in a six-to-three decision.

Id. at 491 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, and in part by Justice Thomas. Thomas, joined by Scalia,
wrote separately to explain that he had refused to join the passages in Souter’s opinion
applying the Central Hudson test to determine the constitutionality of the Marketing Orders:
“I continue to disagree with the use of the Central Hudson balancing test and the discounted
weight given to commercial speech generally.” Id. at 504 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
89
Id. at 487 (Souter, J., dissenting).
90
Id. at 478.
91
Id. at 491–504.
92
533 U.S. 405 (2001).
93
7 U.S.C. §§ 6101–12 (2000).
94
7 U.S.C. § 6104(c)(4) (2000).
95
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 408.
88
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Switching his view of the merits from Glickman, Justice Kennedy
authored the Court’s opinion in United Foods.96 He read Glickman as
turning entirely on the application of Abood’s germaneness test. United
Foods interpreted “the opinion and the analysis of the Court” in Glickman
as proceeding from “the premise that the producers were bound together
and required by the statute to market their products according to
cooperative rules. To that extent, their mandated participation in an
advertising program with a particular message was the logical
concomitant of a valid scheme of economic regulation.”97 Because in
Glickman the “producers were bound together in the common venture,
the imposition upon their First Amendment rights caused by using
compelled contributions for germane advertising was, as in Abood and
Keller, in furtherance of an otherwise legitimate program.”98
United Foods held that the assessments imposed by the Mushroom
Council, unlike those at issue in Glickman, were “not part of some
broader regulatory scheme,”99 but were used merely to support the
advertising itself.100 The assessments in United Foods thus failed Abood’s
germaneness test. “The expression respondent is required to support is
not germane to a purpose related to an association independent from the
speech itself; and the rationale of Abood extends to the party who objects
to the compelled support for this speech.”101
United Foods explicitly repudiated the central postulate of Glickman,
which is that the compelled subsidization of speech does not raise First
Amendment concerns unless the compelled speech is ideological in
nature. United Foods announced “that speech need not be characterized
as political before it receives First Amendment protection,”102 and it

96
Justice Stevens also switched his vote. Justice Breyer authored a dissent, joined by
Justice Ginsburg and in part by Justice O’Connor.
97
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 412.
98
Id. at 414–15.
99
Id. at 415.
100
“The only program the Government contends the compelled contributions serve is the
very advertising scheme in question.” Id. at 415.
The program sustained in Glickman differs from the one under review
in a most fundamental respect. In Glickman the mandated assessments
for speech were ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting
marketing autonomy. Here, for all practical purposes, the advertising
itself, far from being ancillary, is the principal object of the regulatory
scheme.
Id. at 411–12.
101
Id. at 415–16.
102
Id. at 413. Stevens wrote separately to explain his own switch:
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asserted that constitutional scrutiny is triggered whenever persons are
forced to “subsidize speech with which they disagree”103 or whenever
“certain individuals” are compelled “to pay subsidies for speech to
which they object.”104 I have argued elsewhere that this assertion is a
mistake of the first magnitude,105 and I shall not repeat those arguments
here. There are numerous circumstances in which First Amendment
concerns are not aroused even though persons are required to pay for
speech with which they disagree. Attorneys’ fees statutes are obvious
examples.106
Quite apart from generic issues of compelled subsidization of
speech, however, United Foods also addresses the more specific questions
of compelled subsidization of commercial speech or, alternatively, coerced
affiliation with an association that engages primarily in commercial
speech. United Foods does not clearly distinguish between issues of
compelled subsidization of speech and issues of compelled affiliation.
Although this distinction had been clarified in the progression from

As we held in Glickman, Keller, and a number of other cases, . . . a
compelled subsidy is permissible when it is ancillary, or “germane,” to
a valid cooperative endeavor. The incremental impact on the liberty of
a person who has already surrendered far greater liberty to the
collective entity (either voluntarily or as a result of permissible
compulsion) does not, in my judgment, raise a significant
constitutional issue if it is ancillary to the main purpose of the
collective program.
....
This case, however, raises the open question whether such compulsion
is constitutional when nothing more than commercial advertising is at
stake. The naked imposition of such compulsion, like a naked restraint
on speech itself, seems quite different to me. We need not decide
whether other interests, such as . . . health or artistic concerns . . . might
justify a compelled subsidy like this, but surely the interest in making
one entrepreneur finance advertising for the benefit of his competitors,
including some who are not required to contribute, is insufficient.
Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens added a footnote that seems even more
inconsistent with the logic of Glickman:
I think it clear that government compulsion to finance objectionable
speech imposes a greater restraint on liberty than government
regulation of money used to subsidize the speech of others. Even in
the commercial speech context, I think it entirely proper for the Court
to rely on the First Amendment when evaluating the significance of
such compulsion.
Id. at 418 n.*.
103
Id. at 411.
104
Id. at 410.
105
See Post, supra note 11.
106
See, e.g., Banning v. Newdow, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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Abood to Lehnert, it remains obscure in the Glickman-United Foods-Johanns
trilogy.107 In the remainder of this Lecture, therefore, I shall discuss two
alternative interpretations of United Foods. I shall read the decision as
concerned either with compelled subsidization of speech or with coerced
affiliation. In each instance, however, I shall focus on the jurisprudential
implications of the fact that United Foods involves commercial speech,
rather than public discourse.
IV. UNITED FOODS AND THE COMPELLED SUBSIDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL
SPEECH
United Foods rejects Glickman’s distinction between compelled speech
and the compelled subsidization of speech, and it explains that the
compelled subsidization of speech raises serious First Amendment
questions even if the speech at issue is commercial. This holding puts
United Foods in serious tension with Zauderer, which at the time was the
Court’s governing precedent concerning the constitutionality of
compelled commercial speech. In Zauderer the Court had held that
mandatory commercial disclosures implicated only “minimal” First
Amendment interests. Zauderer necessarily implied that compelled
subsidization of these disclosures would also implicate only “minimal”
First Amendment interests.
United Foods attempts to distinguish Zauderer on two grounds. First,
United Foods argues that the Disciplinary Rule at issue in Zauderer
applied to “attorneys who advertised by their own choice,”108 and who,
if they wished, could refrain from advertising at all. In United Foods, by
contrast, commercial firms were forced to pay the assessments whether
they wished to or not. Second, United Foods argues that in Zauderer the
state’s concern was to prevent advertisements that were potentially
misleading. In United Foods, by contrast, “there is no suggestion . . . that
the mandatory assessments imposed to require one group of private
persons to pay for speech by others are somehow necessary to make
voluntary advertisements nonmisleading for consumers.”109
United Foods’s first proposed ground of distinction is unpersuasive.
The attorney in Zauderer was forced to disclose commercial information
as a condition of advertising his legal services. The commercial speaker
107
Glickman shuffles uneasily between issues of speech and association. Johanns
addresses only the question of compelled subsidization of speech; it erroneously reads
United Foods as entirely concerned with that question.
108
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 416.
109
Id.
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in United Foods was forced to subsidize advertisements as a condition of
its selling mushrooms. In Zauderer the lawyer could have ceased to
advertise; in United Foods the commercial firm could have ceased to sell
mushrooms. In both cases the requirement of compelled commercial
speech was imposed as a condition of engaging in commercial activity.
In neither case was it unconditional.
The second ground of distinction advanced by United Foods correctly
identifies a real difference from Zauderer, but the meaning attributed by
the Court to this difference is obscure. It is true that the disclosure at
issue in Zauderer was imposed in order to foreclose the possibility of
consumer deception, whereas the regulation in United Foods was
imposed in order to promote the market in mushrooms. But Zauderer
did not hold that a commercial speaker’s First Amendment interests
were “minimal” because the state possessed a powerful interest in
averting potential deception.
Instead it held that because the
constitutional value of commercial speech lies in the circulation of
information, commercial speakers do not possess more than residual
interests in deciding what kinds of advertisements to promulgate. This
conclusion applies as fully to the mushroom producer in United Foods as
it does to the lawyer in Zauderer. Within the logic of Zauderer, therefore,
the commercial speaker in United Foods should possess merely
“minimal” First Amendment interests, and these interests should easily
have been overridden by the state’s need to promote and stabilize the
market in mushrooms.
United Foods thus implicitly alters the logic of Zauderer. The holding
of United Foods can be explained only on the assumption that commercial
speakers retain significant constitutional interests that are not fully
captured by the constitutional values inherent in the circulation of
information.110 Like Souter’s dissent in Glickman, United Foods must
break with the Court’s traditional explanation of its commercial speech
doctrine and move from constitutional values that are audience-centered
to those that are speaker-centered.111 The Court’s subsequent decision in
In his dissent in Johanns, Souter explicitly reads United Foods as attributing
“autonomy” interests to commercial speakers. Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 125
S. Ct. 2055, 2071 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter’s dissent was joined by Kennedy, the
author of United Foods, and by Stevens, the author of Glickman.
111
Such an implicit re-evaluation of the constitutional values in commercial speech might
explain the increasing severity with which the Court has in recent years applied the Central
Hudson test. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367–68 (2002);
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554–55 (2001); Greater New Orleans Bd. Ass’n
v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999). It is plain that there is disagreement among the
Justices joining the Court’s opinion in United Foods about what test should be used to
110

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 [2006], Art. 1

578

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Johanns holds merely that taxes used to support government speech can
never give rise to First Amendment claims, and it does not in any way
modify or alleviate this implicit shift.
V. UNITED FOODS AND COERCED AFFILIATION WITH AN ASSOCIATION THAT
ENGAGES IN COMMERCIAL SPEECH
United Foods invalidates the mandatory assessments of the
Mushroom Council by applying the germaneness test of Abood. The use
of the germaneness test suggests that the question of coerced affiliation
was constitutionally decisive for United Foods, which asserts that
“[b]efore addressing whether a conflict with freedom of belief exists, a
threshold inquiry must be whether there is some state imposed
obligation which makes group membership less than voluntary; for it is
only the overriding associational purpose which allows any compelled
subsidy for speech in the first place.”112 United Foods explains that
requiring payments to subsidize the speech of an association is
constitutional only if “the compelled contribution of moneys to pay for
expressive activities [is] a necessary incident of a larger expenditure for
an otherwise proper goal requiring the cooperative activity,”113 and it
ultimately distinguishes Glickman on the ground that in the latter case
there was an adequate constitutional justification for “requiring the
cooperative activity.”
United Foods’s reasoning is far from clear. It might concern the
structure of plaintiffs’ claim of compelled speech, in which case United
Foods holds that persons cannot constitutionally be compelled to
subsidize speech unless the state is justified in forcing them to affiliate
with an expressive association.114 But this interpretation of United Foods
measure the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech. In Glickman, Thomas,
joined by Scalia, had dissented specially to note that:
I continue to disagree with the use of the Central Hudson balancing test
and the discounted weight given to commercial speech generally. . . .
Because the regulation at issue here fails even the more lenient Central
Hudson test, however, it, a fortiori, would fail the higher standard that
should be applied to all speech, whether commercial or not.
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 504 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See also supra note 88.
112
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413.
113
Id. at 414. The Court continues: “The central holding in Keller, moreover, was that the
objecting members were not required to give speech subsidies for matters not germane to
the larger regulatory purpose which justified the required association.” Id.
114
It is noteworthy that Justice Stevens’ short concurrence explicitly avoids this
implication. Stevens reserves the question as to which interests would justify compelled
contributions for collective advertising. Stevens concludes only that “surely the interest in
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is fundamentally implausible.115 In Zauderer commercial disclosures
were mandated without also requiring “cooperative activity.” If, as
Souter argued in his dissent in Glickman, the constitutional standard for
assessing the mandatory subsidization of commercial speech were to be
the same Central Hudson test as is used to determine the constitutionality
of restrictions on commercial speech,116 the Mushroom Act’s goal of
“maintain[ing] and expand[ing] existing markets and uses for
mushrooms”117 would plainly meet the Central Hudson requirement of
substantiality, even though it does not also require “cooperative
activity.” Even if five Justices of the Court were prepared to rule, as
Thomas believes, that “any regulation that compels the funding of
advertising must be subjected to the most stringent First Amendment
making one entrepreneur finance advertising for the benefit of his competitors, including
some who are not required to contribute, is insufficient” to justify compelled contributions
for speech. Id. at 418; see supra note 102.
115
There is no reason to believe that compelled speech can be justified only by cooperative activity. We compel persons to report traffic accidents, for example, or to report
potential public health risks like those involving child abuse, without also requiring
compulsory affiliation of any kind.
116
United Foods is deliberately noncommittal on this point. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410.
In his dissent in Glickman, Souter had explicitly argued that the Central Hudson test be
employed. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 491–92 (Souter, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Johanns, by
contrast, Souter seemed to suggest “that Central Hudson scrutiny is not appropriate in a
case involving compelled speech rather than restrictions on speech.” Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2074 n.10 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). Lower courts
have reached quite disparate conclusions on this question. Some courts have held that a
state regulation that compels speech, rather prohibits it, “tends to [be] less objectionable
under the First Amendment.” Walker v. Bd. of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme
Court of Tenn., 38 S.W.3d 540, 545 (Tenn. 2001); see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14 (1985); Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Tenn. Regulatory
Auth., 79 S.W.3d 506, 519 (Tenn. 2002). Others have held the reverse, that “the relaxed
scrutiny of commercial speech . . . provided for by Central Hudson” ought to be
“inapplicable” “to speech—commercial or otherwise—that is compelled. . . . It is one thing
to force someone to close her mouth; it is quite another to force her to become a
mouthpiece.” Mich. Pork Producers Ass’n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 163 (6th Cir. 2003),
vacated sub nom. Mich. Pork Producers Ass’n v. Campaign for Family Farms, 125 S. Ct. 2511
(2005); see also Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263, 280 n.15 (3d Cir. 2004) (Rendell, J.,
concurring), vacated sub nom. Lovell v. Cochran, 125 S. Ct. 2511 (2005); Cal-Almond, Inc. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 14 F.3d 429, 436 (9th Cir. 1993).
117
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 421 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer continued:
As the Mushroom Act’s economic goals indicate, collective promotion
and research is a perfectly traditional form of government intervention
in the marketplace. Promotion may help to overcome inaccurate
consumer perceptions about a product. . . .
Overcoming those
perceptions will sometimes bring special public benefits. . . . And
compelled payment may be needed to produce those benefits where,
otherwise, some producers would take a free ride on the expenditures
of others.
Id. at 421–22.
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scrutiny,”118 there are nevertheless “compelling purposes” capable of
satisfying strict scrutiny that do not also require cooperative activity.
We thus cannot plausibly interpret United Foods’s use of Abood’s
germaneness test as addressing plaintiff’s claim of compelled
subsidization of speech. It must therefore concern plaintiff’s claim of
coerced affiliation.
Just as Ellis and Lehnert had conceptualized
mandatory union dues as compelling affiliation with the expressive
association of a union, so United Foods evidently conceived the
mandatory assessments of the Mushroom Council as compelling
affiliation with the private organization of mushroom producers in
whose name the mushroom advertisements were issued.119 This
interpretation of United Foods has the advantage of explaining its
otherwise mysterious use of Abood’s germaneness test and of
illuminating why United Foods sought to identify an “overriding
associational purpose which allows any compelled subsidy for speech in
the first place.”120
The disadvantage of this interpretation of United Foods, however, is
that it raises disquieting questions about the constitutional definition of
an expressive association. The First Amendment right to affiliate or not
to affiliate with an organization applies only to associations that are
“expressive,” which is to say only to associations that engage in
“protected speech.”121 Heretofore all associations deemed expressive,
like unions or bar associations, were organizations that engaged in
public discourse. United Foods is the first decision to conceive an

United Foods, 533 U.S. at 419 (Thomas, J., concurring); see Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2066
(Thomas, J., concurring).
119
The Court in Johanns interpreted United Foods as resting “on the assumption that the
advertising was private speech, not government speech.” Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2061; see,
e.g., Pelts & Skins LLC v. Landreneau, 365 F.3d 423, 434 (5th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct.
2511 (2005). “The common thread uniting Abood, Keller, Glickman, and United Foods is that
compelled subsidization of speech is permissible when individuals have been bound into a
collective association.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
120
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413.
In Abood, the infringement upon First Amendment associational rights
worked by a union shop arrangement was “constitutionally justified
by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the
union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress.”
To attain the desired benefit of collective bargaining, union members
and nonmembers were required to associate with one another, and the
legitimate purposes of the group were furthered by the mandated
association.
Id. at 413–14 (internal citations omitted).
121
See supra text accompanying notes 53–55.
118
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association as expressive even though it engages only in commercial
speech.
The problem with this interpretation of United Foods is that virtually
all
commercial
organizations—all
corporations
or
business
partnerships—engage in commercial speech. If an organization is
deemed expressive merely because it engages in commercial speech, all
laws regulating affiliation and de-affiliation with business organizations,
as well as all laws regulating the internal capacity of persons to control
the commercial speech of such organizations,122 will be subject to First
Amendment scrutiny. This is plainly untenable.
It is noteworthy, therefore, that United Foods uses the germaneness
test of Abood to distinguish commercial associations that exist primarily
for the purpose of commercial expression, like the Mushroom Council,
from commercial associations that additionally serve other purposes, like
the Nectarine Administrative Committee and the Peach Commodity
Committee.123 This application of the germaneness test implies that First
Amendment rights of association protect against compelled affiliation
with commercial associations that primarily engage in commercial
speech, but not against coerced affiliation with commercial associations
that also serve other ends.124
VI. ASSESSING THE INNOVATIONS OF UNITED FOODS
United Foods is a highly innovative and consequential decision,
whether it is read as turning on the idea that the compulsory
subsidization of commercial speech ought to receive careful

See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
Stevens switched his vote between Glickman and United Foods specifically because he
concluded that in United Foods “nothing more than commercial advertising is at stake.”
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring).
124
Because Johanns conceptualizes United Foods entirely as a compelled speech case,
Johanns does not address the implicit holding of United Foods that First Amendment
interests are infringed by compelled affiliation with organizations engaged primarily in
commercial speech. It is noteworthy, however, that the “government speech” exception
which Johanns postulates for the compelled subsidization of speech also makes theoretical
sense in the context of compelled association. First Amendment rights cannot be infringed
by the use of compulsory tax dollars to affiliate persons with the state itself, even with a
state organization that is primarily engaged in commercial speech. This is because all
citizens of a state are already affiliated with their government by virtue of their
membership in a democratic polity that demands forms of associative solidarity like
compulsory jury duty, the military draft, and taxes. It is meaningless to appeal to the First
Amendment to complain that the state has coercively required affiliation with itself, as
such affiliation is always already implicit in the obligations of citizenship.
122
123
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constitutional scrutiny, or instead on the idea that the Abood
germaneness test protects against coerced affiliation with associations
that engage primarily in commercial speech.
Neither of these
fundamental innovations of United Foods is in any way affected by
Johanns.
The innovations of United Foods are not, in my view, well taken.
They are largely implicit in the opinion’s structure, and as a consequence
they are never openly articulated and systematically defended. When
rendered explicit, it is plain that they are inconsistent with important
precedents and threaten to unsettle significant dimensions of First
Amendment jurisprudence. They are also in deep tension with basic
principles that inform contemporary regulations of consumer markets.
Consider, first, United Foods’s view that commercial speakers retain
significant constitutional interests that must be balanced against state
interests in compelling the subsidization of commercial speech. United
Foods never explains the underlying justification for this view. If taken to
its logical conclusion, it might signify that the Court is moving toward
the position that there is no “philosophical or historical basis for
asserting that ‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ than
‘noncommercial’ speech.”125 Justice Thomas has been urging this view
for some years now. Any such position would require the Court strictly
to review the myriad of commercial rules that now regulate the forms of
communication in which commercial transactions are embedded. The
potential for commercial speech doctrine to evolve into this kind of
Lochnerism was long ago predicted,126 but Thomas seems to regard the
prospect with undisguised relish:
Although the Constitution may not “enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics,” and thus the Government has a
considerable range of authority in regulating the
Nation’s economic structure, part of the Constitution—
the First Amendment—does enact a distinctly
individualistic notion of “the freedom of speech,” and

125
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring);
see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627,
628 (1990); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and
the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 452–48 (1971); Rodney A. Smolla,
Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial
Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993).
126
Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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Congress may not simply collectivize that aspect of our
society, regardless of what it may do elsewhere.127
Of course the likelihood that United Foods signifies such a radical
shift is quite small. It is more probable that the Court means to signify
that commercial speakers retain some interests, although not interests
that are of equal weight to those of participants in public discourse. But
even this more modest innovation can have potentially far-reaching
practical consequences. Many of the most fundamental principles of
contemporary commercial speech doctrine are built on the premise that
commercial speakers lack strong independent constitutional interests.
The Court has encouraged states to regulate commercial speech by using
prior restraints, for example, and this approach, as I have argued
elsewhere, seems to rely on the assumption that the constitutional value
of commercial speech lies in the circulation of information rather than in
the independent interests of commercial speakers.128 The same can be
said about the Court’s rule that the overbreadth doctrine will not apply
to commercial speech.129
In the end, the impact of United Foods on the structure of commercial
speech doctrine will depend on the exact nature of the interests that the
Court wishes to attribute to commercial speakers.130 The question is how
the interests of commercial speakers will be understood to differ from
the interests ascribed to participants in public discourse.131 The Court
will not only have to specify the circumstances that enable the interests
of commercial speakers to prevail, as in United Foods, it will also have to
articulate the circumstances in which these interests are diminished, as in
Zauderer. We cannot begin to predict the effect of United Foods on
existing doctrine until we have some careful theoretical account of the
character of the constitutional interests that the Court wishes to attribute
to commercial speakers.
It is clear, however, that even if United Foods means that commercial
speakers retain interests as against compulsory commercial speech only
when such speech is mandated for reasons other than protecting

127
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 505 n.3 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
128
See Post, supra note 16, at 32–33.
129
Id. at 29–32.
130
Even in Zauderer the Court had postulated that commercial speakers retained some
residual, minimal forms of constitutional interests. See supra note 25.
131
See Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993).
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consumers against potential deception,132 United Foods would
nevertheless imply a potentially broad and destabilizing change in the
texture of the regulations that presently govern commercial speech. This
is because commercial speech is routinely and pervasively compelled for
reasons that have little to do with the prevention of deception.
The Federal Trade Commission now imposes mandatory disclosure
rules on a wide range of industries, requiring sellers to divulge such
information as “the durability of light bulbs, octane ratings for gasoline,
tar and nicotine content of cigarettes, mileage per gallon for automobiles,
or care labeling of textile wearing apparel.”133 Congress has passed
innumerable statutes that contain analogous disclosure requirements.134
These disclosure requirements force commercial speakers to engage in
commercial speech, but they do not do so merely to prevent potential
consumer deception. They primarily seek to reduce information costs
and thereby to establish a more educated and efficient marketplace.135

132
The narrowest possible interpretation of United Foods is that the case stands for the
proposition that commercial speakers can be required to speak for any reason other than
compelling them to subsidize the speech of potential competitors. Although Stevens’
concurrence in United Foods is written so as to gesture toward this narrow conclusion, supra
note 114, Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in United Foods is not. Kennedy’s opinion
focuses primarily on the constitutional interests of commercial speakers, rather than on the
strength of the state’s interests in imposing a regulation.
133
Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90
HARV. L. REV. 661, 664 (1977).
134
Just to offer some few examples enforced by the FTC, the Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451–61 (2000), directs the FTC to issue regulations requiring that all
consumer commodities other than food, drugs, therapeutic devices, and cosmetics be
labeled to disclose net contents, identity of commodity, and name and place of business of
the product’s manufacturer, packer, or distributor; the Truth in Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2000), requires all creditors who deal with consumers to make
certain written disclosures concerning all finance charges and related aspects of credit
transactions (including disclosing finance charges expressed as an annual percentage rate);
the Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 68–68j (2000), requires that wool product
labels indicate the country in which the product was processed or manufactured and that
mail order promotional materials clearly and conspicuously state whether a wool product
was processed or manufactured in the United States or was imported; the Fur Products
Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 69–69j (2000), requires that articles of apparel made of fur be
labeled and that invoices and advertising for furs and fur products specify, among other
things, the true English name of the animal from which the fur was taken and whether the
fur is dyed or used; the Textile Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 70–70k (2000),
requires that any textile fiber product processed or manufactured in the United States be so
identified and that mail order promotional materials clearly and conspicuously indicate
whether a textile fiber product was processed or manufactured in the United States or was
imported.
135
See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2001)
(upholding mercury disclosure rule even though “the compelled disclosure at issue here

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/1

Post: Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech a

2006]

Transparent and Efficient Markets

585

The promotion of transparent markets is a major objective of
contemporary regulatory regimes.136 Commercial speech is compelled
for other reasons as well. Recently, for example, a congressional statute
was upheld that prohibited telemarketers from abandoning calls to
consumers.137 In essence the statute sought to increase the accountability
of telemarketers by preventing them from engaging in “no speech.”138 In
California commercial vendors cannot sell goods to consumers that
contain chemicals known to be carcinogenic or to cause reproductive
toxicity without first providing “clear and reasonable warning.”139 The
purpose of this mandated warning is not to prevent deception, but to
avoid unwitting harm. Does United Foods imply that all these various
forms of compelled commercial speech are now constitutionally suspect?
Analogous problems of indeterminacy afflict United Foods if it is
interpreted as holding that First Amendment rights of association are
implicated whenever persons are compelled to affiliate with associations
that primarily engage in commercial speech. If the Court means to hold
that all organizations that engage in commercial speech are expressive
associations, such that First Amendment rights of affiliation and deaffiliation apply to them, the Court has crafted a rule that threatens to
constitutionalize much of the law of corporations and business
organizations. But if the Court means to cabin these consequences by
manipulating the distinction between commercial organizations that are
was not intended to prevent ‘consumer confusion or deception’ per se, . . . but rather to
better inform consumers about the products they purchase”).
[M]andated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information
does not offend the core First Amendment values of promoting
efficient exchange of information or protecting individual liberty
interests. Such disclosure furthers, rather than hinders, the First
Amendment goal of the discovery of truth and contributes to the
efficiency of the marketplace of ideas.
Id. at 115. See also CFTC v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding disclosure
rules of the Commodity Exchange Act because “[t]he disclosure requirement at issue here
was reasonably related to the government’s interest in preventing . . . hypothetical
statistical presentations that, as Congress observed, could lead to inefficiencies in the
commodities markets that are contrary to the public interest”).
136
See, e.g., Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rule, 43 FED. REG. 59,614, 59,638 (Dec. 21,
1978) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 436) (“By establishing a uniform, minimal set of
required information, disclosure requirements enhance the efficiency of markets by
facilitating comparison of competing franchise offerings.”); Daniel D. Rubino, et al.,
Corporate and Securities Law Update, 67 PLI/NY 11, 51 (1999) (“One of the principal goals
underlying SEC regulation . . . is the fostering of market transparency.”); see also supra note
36.
137
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2005).
138
Id. at 341.
139
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2006).
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primarily engaged in commercial speech and other commercial
organizations, then the Court must explain the distinction between
organizations which have the primary purpose of engaging in
commercial speech, like the Mushroom Council in United Foods, and
organizations which engage in commercial speech as a consequence of
pursuing other objectives, like the Nectarine Administrative Committee
and the Peach Commodity Committee in Glickman. This distinction is far
from obvious, and it is noteworthy that there is no analogous distinction
in the contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence of association
rights. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,140 for example, the Court held
that the Boy Scouts were an expressive association without considering
whether the primary purpose of the Scouts was to engage in public
speech. It was enough that the Scouts had a message that they sought to
convey.
The uncertainties that bedevil United Foods as a compelled
association case are analogous to the uncertainties that envelop United
Foods as a compelled subsidization of speech case. These two aspects of
United Foods are theoretically connected because First Amendment rights
of association derive from the First Amendment rights of speakers. The
Constitution protects association rights because association is an
indispensable method for speakers to amplify their voices. To recognize
constitutional rights in commercial speakers, therefore, is to recognize
the right of commercial speakers to associate to promulgate their speech.
Commercial organizations can be expressive associations for purposes of
the First Amendment only if commercial speakers have the right to
engage in commercial speech, and only if commercial organizations are
understood as an effective vehicle for the exercise of that right. This
suggests that United Foods’s holding that the right to associate or not to
associate with commercial organizations is protected by the First
Amendment is but a corollary of its modification of Zauderer to affirm
that commercial speakers retain more than residual rights. To theorize
which commercial organizations should receive constitutional protection
as expressive associations is to theorize the nature of the rights possessed
by commercial speakers.
It is apparent that the Court has not sharply formulated the
constitutional conception of commercial speakers that it meant to
advance in United Foods. With the benefit of time and hindsight,
however, we can conduct a thought experiment to test what seems to be
the two innovations of United Foods. Imagine an advertising firm whose
140
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primary business is to produce and publish advertisements. The firm is
thus like the Mushroom Council at issue in United Foods, because its chief
business is commercial speech. Does United Foods imply that such a firm
is an expressive association so that all regulations concerning affiliation
and de-affiliation with the firm are subject to rigorous First Amendment
scrutiny, even if the firm is a publicly held corporation subject to
ordinary SEC regulation? Does United Foods imply that strict scrutiny
should apply to rules regarding entry and departure from the firm, or to
rules regarding the internal structures by which the firm’s
communications are determined?
These questions test both innovations of United Foods. If the Court is
unwilling to extend First Amendment rights of association to a firm that
is entirely dedicated to the publication of commercial speech, we have
reason to doubt the seriousness with which the Court is committed to the
proposition that commercial speakers retain constitutionally protected
rights. These rights would necessarily include the authority to associate
together to amplify commercially protected speech. If the Court is
unwilling to extend First Amendment rights of association to our
hypothesized advertising firm, we may ask why it was willing to apply
Abood’s germaneness test to the Mushroom Council in United Foods. It is
true that in United Foods the Court was faced with state requirements that
persons affiliate with a commercial association, whereas in our thought
experiment we are imagining state restrictions on such affiliation, but
why would this distinction be constitutionally pertinent? After all, the
First Amendment right not to associate is but a corollary of the First
Amendment right to associate. If the latter does not obtain, neither does
the former.
Our thought experiment, in short, suggests that the Court may well
have been wiser to attend to the argument in Justice Breyer’s dissenting
opinion in United Foods that regulation of commercial organizations does
not raise First Amendment concerns. The mandatory assessments of the
Mushroom Council might most defensibly have been regarded as “a
form of economic regulation, not ‘commercial speech,’ for purposes of
applying First Amendment presumptions.”141
VII. CONCLUSION
United Foods is an extraordinary decision. It tinkers with the logic of
Zauderer in ways that threaten to unleash unpredictable transformations
141

United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 428 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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of existing First Amendment doctrine. By seeming to relocate the
constitutional value of commercial speech from the circulation of
information to the independent interests of speakers, United Foods takes a
step toward destabilizing existing regimes of market regulation and
consumer protection in favor of a far-reaching principle that could
possibly constitutionalize large stretches of corporate and commercial
law. Johanns suggests that the Court still has not comprehended the
potentially grave consequences of United Food’s innovations. Johanns’s
embrace of a “government speech” exception to the compelled
subsidization of speech doctrine advanced in United Foods may resolve
the agricultural marketing cases, but it nevertheless permits the
innovations of United Foods to remain embedded within First
Amendment jurisprudence, where they are certain to spark future
litigation. When the Court does finally come face to face with the
consequences of these innovations, we shall see how willing it is to
follow the novel principles advanced in United Foods.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/1

